প্রামাণ্যের পরস্তত্ব স্থাপন : আচার্য উদয়নের মত সমীক্ষা/ The Establishment of the Extrinsic Validity of Knowledge (Parataḥ-prāmāṇya) : A Critical Review of Ācārya Udayana’s View

Abstract

In Indian tradition, valid knowledge is termed pramā, and the validity of knowledge is called prāmāṇya. Although the term prāmāṇya also indicates the state of being the instrument of valid knowledge (pramā-karaṇatva), in most cases, we understand prāmāṇya as the ‘truth-character’ or ‘validity’ (pramātva) itself. Indian philosophers are divided regarding the inquiry into how this pramātva is determined. One group claims this validity to be self-dependent (svataḥ), while the other group describes it as dependent on external factors (parataḥ). Among those who support the theory of self-validity (svataḥ-prāmāṇyavāda), the Mīmāṃsā school is preeminent. On the other hand, the Naiyāyikas represent those who support the theory of external validity (parataḥ-prāmāṇyavāda). Following the direction of Ācārya Udayana, the objective of this essay is to provide an outline of the specific arguments used by the Naiyāyikas to refute the claims of the proponents of self-validity.